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Abstract 
Intelligence fusion centers have grown rapidly in the last few years as state, local and 
tribal law enforcement agencies have attempted to find the best way to share information 
about threats to their communities.  The Department of Homeland Security and the 
Information Sharing Environment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
embraced the fusion centers as being an important mechanism to aid them in their 
missions to share terrorism information among law enforcement, the private sector and 
the intelligence community.  The development and management of fusion centers has 
received significant guidance from the Justice Department, via the Global Intelligence 
Working group, by developing standards for structure and processes.  Critics, however, 
are concerned the centers have inadequate protections for privacy and civil rights.  This 
paper examines the issues in the centers’ development and provides an examination of 
the support and criticisms of fusion centers. 
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The Intelligence Fusion Process for State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement 
 
 
 Over the last several years the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has 
committed millions of dollars to help state and local law enforcement agencies develop 
intelligence fusion centers (Allen, 2008).  While the funds have been readily accepted, 
concerns have been expressed about the efficiency of intelligence fusion centers (General 
Accountability Office, 2007), their effectiveness (Masse & Rollins, 2007) and whether 
there are adequate protections in place to protect citizens’ privacy and civil rights 
(German & Stanley, 2007).  
 The fusion process represents a new generation for the intelligence function and a 
new structure for most state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies to understand.  
Contrary to intuition, the fusion process (analyzing information from diverse resources) 
and the creation of fusion centers (the physical plant) are more complex than merely 
changing organizational functions for an existing law enforcement intelligence unit.  It 
typically involves either the re-engineering of the entire conceptual framework of the 
intelligence function in an agency or the creation of an entirely new entity.  It requires 
engaging a wide array of people and organizations to be both contributors and consumers 
of the intelligence function; it involves changing attitudes and processes of personnel; it 
requires establishing new functional and information sharing processes among state, 
county, municipal, tribal and federal law enforcement partners; it involves the 
development of new agreements and functional relationships; the development of new 
policies and processes; and the inculcation of the Intelligence Led Policingi philosophy.   
As a result, the challenges are multifold, not the least of which is opening oneself 
and one’s agency to the challenges of organizational change.  Most humans are dogmatic, 
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resisting change.  However, if incongruent past practices and erroneous assumptions are 
not eliminated from the development processes of fusion centers, the likelihood of 
success is diminished.  The following discussion is intended to provide insight about the 
intelligence fusion process by providing a perspective on its role and the challenges 
posed by the process. 
 
Historical Perspective 
Initially, intelligence fusion centers were referred to as Regional Intelligence 
Centers (RIC).  They took different forms throughout the United States with no “single 
model” for what the intelligence center did or how it should be organized.  They evolved 
largely based on local initiatives as a response to perceived threats related to crime, drug 
trafficking, and/or terrorism within a geographic region (Carter, Forthcoming).  The 
intent was to marshal the resources and expertise of multiple agencies within that region 
to deal with cross-jurisdictional crime problems.  In some cases, a region was defined as 
a county (e.g., Rockland County, New York Intelligence Center); as the area surrounding 
a major city (e.g., Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center); a portion of a state 
(e.g., Northern California Regional Intelligence Center), or it may encompass an entire 
state (e.g., Minnesota Joint Analysis Center) (Carter, Forthcoming). 
 Most of the earliest RICs began as the product of counterdrug initiatives starting 
in the 1980s.  Indeed, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) intelligence 
centersii served as models for successful structures and initiatives as well as identifying 
systemic issues that needed to be overcome.iii  The HIDTA centers embraced federal, 
state and local partnerships and focused on developing the expertise of their analysts to 
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provide intelligence to their operational consumers.  Interestingly, the HIDTA Centers 
are organized under the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) yet have 
personnel assigned from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).  Since they are 
organizationally separate from DEA they provide greater support to local task forces and 
agencies than the broader DEA operational missions.  As time passed, DEA operations 
relied much more heavily on the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) than on the HIDTA 
Intelligence Centers, although there is regional variation.  As a result of this unique 
organizational framework and their unitary mission of drug control, the HIDTA 
Intelligence Centers, while effective in counterdrug operations, did not evolve into the 
“all crimes” fusion center model. 
In the late 1990s, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(ATF) developed a number of new programs designed to reduce gun violence.  Emerging 
from these initiatives were ATF Regional Crime Gun Centers.  The centers, in some 
cases co-located with the HIDTA RIC, had a number of intelligence-related roles 
including “…analyzing trace data to identify gun traffickers, disseminate investigative 
leads, and coordinate with the HIDTA RIC to identify drug traffickers and their sources 
of guns” (ATF, 2008).  In virtually all cases, both the HIDTA and ATF intelligence 
centers had a great deal of interaction with state, local and tribal law enforcement 
agencies.  The intent was to integrate – i.e., “fuse” – information from diverse sources to 
better understand and prevent multi-jurisdictional crime problems. 
 Hence the foundation was laid for intelligence fusion centers.  However, beyond 
idiosyncratic local crime issues, there was little incentive to expand the centers.  Of 
course, this changed after September 11, 2001.   
5 
 
 Because of the RICs demonstrated successes and the information sharing 
challenges of counterterrorism, additional state and local entities embraced the concept 
and began developing their own centers.  The federal government, at first by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), saw the value of these initiatives and began 
providing funding support.  Fusion centers were about to experience an expanding role. 
Recognizing that state and local fusion centers represent a critical 
source of local information about potential threats and a 
mechanism for providing terrorism-related information and 
intelligence from federal sources, the Program Manager for the ISE 
(PM-ISE), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) are taking steps to partner with and 
leverage fusion centers as part of the overall information sharing 
environment (General Accountability Office, 2007:2). 
 Building on this observation, the General Accountability Office (GAO) went on 
to document a number of federal efforts underway designed to support fusion centers and 
address challenges or obstacles identified by fusion center directors (General 
Accountability Office, 2007: 23-39).   
The first effort cited by the GAO is that the DHS, FBI and the PM-ISE have taken 
actions to assist fusion centers in gaining access to and managing multiple federal 
information systems, including classified systems. This means that state, local and tribal 
fusion center personnel have access to information that may have been collected by the 
intelligence community and/or information that was collected via less stringent legal 
standards than is required for law enforcement agencies.  Access to these systems is 
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viewed by law enforcement as an important factor in helping to “connect the dots” about 
threats, thereby more effectively protecting the community.  Conversely, the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is concerned that efforts such as this will turn “local police 
officers into national domestic intelligence agents” (German & Stanley, 2008:2). 
The second effort is that both the DHS and FBI have committed to providing 
security clearances to state, local and tribal fusion center personnel and reducing the time 
it takes for a clearance to be processed.  This has been a significant issue for law 
enforcement executives because they believe that state, local and tribal law enforcement 
personnel responsible for counterterrorism cannot be effective if they do not have routine 
access to classified information which reflects the most comprehensive information about 
threats.  Once again, concern has been expressed by civil rights advocates that the 
widespread granting of security clearances to state, local and tribal law enforcement 
personnel is evidence that fusion centers and their personnel are becoming federalized.  
In turn, it is argued, that this will reduce privacy protections as well as reduce 
accountability of the fusion center to state and local governments (German & Stanley, 
2007; German & Stanley, 2008; Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2008). 
The next federal initiative is that the DHS and FBI are assisting fusion centers in 
obtaining and retaining qualified personnel, both through assignments of federal 
employees to state fusion centers and through some DHS funding support.  The major 
concern on this issue relates to sustainability.  Federal funding to state and local 
government is virtually always limited to a few years.  If the fusion center is relying on 
federal support to operate, then its sustainability is tenuous.  The Fusion Center 
Guidelines state that while federal funding can be important for fusion center 
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development, that the center’s operation should rely on standard appropriated funds to 
help ensure sustainability (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2005:79).  The other 
concern on this initiative is that fusion centers will rely on federal employees who will 
likely be reassigned when another problem or crisis takes precedence over the fusion 
centers. 
The final two federal initiatives identified by the GAO are less controversial.  The 
penultimate initiative is that federal funds in support of fusion centers have become more 
readily available and streamlined in operation to make grant awards faster and easier.  
Finally, both DOJ and DHS have provided training and technical assistance in support of 
fusion center development and maturation.  On this last point, while the availability of 
training programs have increased, there are still comparatively limited offerings of these 
programs due largely to funding limitations.  It is a massive task to provide law 
enforcement training throughout the United States.  With comparatively small training 
staffs, the new intelligence training efforts have significant challenges to overcome. 
 While progress has been made in the evolution of fusion centers in a 
comparatively short amount of time, many observers and fusion center governing officers 
appear to believe that there is still a “long way to go” before fusion centers will 
seamlessly fulfill their envisioned role. 
 
REFINING THE FUSION CENTER CONCEPT 
 It was clear after the 9/11 terrorists’ attacks that there had been poor information 
sharing among and between all levels of law enforcement and the Intelligence 
Community (9/11 Commission, 2004).  As more information was learned about the 
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terrorists and their minor encounters with state and local law enforcement in the weeks 
and months before the attacks, it was painfully evident that current information systems 
and processes were simply inadequate to deal with threats of this nature.  It was also 
evident that if a diverse array of raw information was collected by different agencies, it 
would be essential to have a mechanism to provide data integration and analysis so its 
meaning would be of value to operational law enforcement personnel. 
 Increasingly, state and local law enforcement leaders recognized that the 
experiences of the HIDTA’s and RIC’s could be applied to counterterrorism.  Because of 
the need to have two-way information sharing directly with federal law enforcement and 
indirectly with the Intelligence Community, the fusion centers, the FBI and DHS reached 
out to each other in order to develop fusion centers more holistically.  Indeed, “federal 
departments and agencies—including DHS, FBI, and DOD—launched efforts to develop 
strategies to incorporate these fusion centers into their information and intelligence 
activities” (PM-ISE, 2006:18). 
Masse and Rollins (2007) note that fusion centers represent a vital part of our 
nation’s homeland security and rely on at least four presumptions. The first of which is 
that intelligence, and the intelligence process, play a vital role in preventing terrorist 
attacks. Second, it is essential to fuse a broader range of data, including nontraditional 
source data, to create a more comprehensive threat picture. Third, state, local, and tribal 
law enforcement and public sector agencies are in a unique position to make observations 
and collect information that may be central to the type of threat assessment referenced 
above.  Lastly, having fusion activities take place at the sub-federal level can benefit state 
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and local communities, and possibly have national benefits as well (Masse & Rollins, 
2007:3). 
 The initial focus of many new fusion centers was exclusively on terrorism – 
indeed, that still remains the case for a few of the centers such as the Georgia Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC)iv.  However, most of the centers broadened their 
focus to embrace “all crimes and all threats”.  The reason was twofold:  First, it was 
recognized that most terrorist acts had a nexus with other crimes.  Hence, focusing 
exclusively on terrorism may miss some important “indicators”.  Second, because there is 
a wide variety of crime, notably criminal enterprises, that were trans-jurisdictional and 
involved in complex criminalityv, it was recognized that the fusion process would be of 
value in dealing with these crimes also. 
 Further evolution of fusion center responsibilities has moved into the arena of an 
“all hazards” focus (in addition to “all crimes, all threats”).  Inclusion of the “all hazards” 
approach has come from two sources:  One is a result of the special conditions on some 
DHS grants to fusion centers that specify “all hazards”.  The second source is from state 
or fusion center governing board mandates.  Moreover, given DHS's responsibility to 
“protect the homeland”, their reach extends beyond terrorism to include natural disasters, 
chemical weapons, weapons of mass destruction and basic law enforcement (Harris, 
2008). 
Recognizing fusion centers were increasingly integrating the concepts of 
established law enforcement intelligence activities with the “all crimes, all threats, all 
hazards” model of intelligence, the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) 
observed: 
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Although the primary emphasis of intelligence/information fusion 
is to identify, deter, and respond to emerging terrorism-related 
threats and risks, a collateral benefit to state, tribal and local 
entities is that it will support ongoing efforts to address non-
terrorism related issues by…allowing State and local entities to 
better identify and forecast emerging crime, public health, and 
quality-of-life trends…supporting targeted law enforcement and 
other multidisciplinary, proactive, risk-based and community-
focused, problem-solving activities; and…improving the delivery 
of emergency and nonemergency services (HSAC, 2005:2). 
 
Structural Issues 
 There is no single model for a fusion center because of the diverse needs and 
environmental characteristics that will affect the structure, processes and products of a 
center.  In states such as Texas and California with their large land mass, large 
populations and international border, the structure and processes of fusion centers will be 
significantly different than predominantly “land locked” rural states such as Wyoming or 
Nebraska. 
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report observed that questions have 
arisen regarding the current and/or potential efficacy of fusion centers.  The report notes 
that in light of the growth of the fusion centers in state and local jurisdictions without a 
coordinated national plan, “…there appears to be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ structural or 
operational model for fusion centers (Masse & Rollins, 2007:18).” From a centralized 
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federal perspective – as reflected in the CRS report – the lack of a uniform model is 
assumed to be a flaw.  However, the state and local perspective is somewhat different.  
Indeed, the ability to build a fusion center around grassroots needs is preferred – this 
permits state and local agencies to mold the fusion center into a model that best suits the 
needs and challenges that are idiosyncratic to each jurisdiction.  As noted by Johnson and 
Dorn, describing the New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC): 
Creating one center for intelligence and terrorism information – to 
combine and distribute that information to law enforcement 
agencies statewide – prevents duplication of effort by multiple 
agencies.  Additionally, one state fusion center serving the entire 
New York law enforcement community provides a comprehensive 
picture of criminal and terrorists networks, aids in the fight against 
future terrorists events and reduces crime (Johnson & Dorn, 
2008:38). 
 Within this same line of thought, fusion centers are also structured differently 
based upon legislative or executive mandates.  For example, Montana’s fusion center – 
Montana All Threat Intelligence Center (MATIC) – is mandated to focus on “all threats”; 
the New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) includes emergency 
operations as well as fusion; the Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC) 
focuses on all crimes; and the Oregon Terrorism Intelligence Threat Assessment Network 
limits its focus to terrorism.  The variability of fusion center structures is broad because 
of functional necessity and the inherent nature of “local control” and “states’ rights” 
perspectives. 
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 While the structure and operational processes of fusion centers may be different, 
national professional standards have nonetheless been articulated which outline “good 
practice” in critical administrative areas regardless of the center’s mission.  That is the 
intent of the Fusion Center Guidelines.vi 
 Despite some criticisms, the fact that fusion centers are structured differently is 
not a weakness, but a strength.  It exemplifies that each center is designed to meet local 
and regional needs as well as being able to best integrate the fusion center with existing 
organizational components and priorities. 
For example, the Michigan State Police have widespread responsibility for both 
traffic and criminal law enforcement throughout the state.  As such, the Michigan 
Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC) is organizationally placed in the state police.  
However, Florida has two predominant state law enforcement organizations:  the Florida 
Highway Patrol, responsible for traffic law enforcement, and the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement (FDLE), responsible for criminal law enforcement.  As a result, the 
Florida Fusion Center is organized as part of the FDLE Office of Statewide Intelligence.  
Hence, each state structured its fusion center in a manner that best fits existing 
organizational structures and functional responsibilities. 
 The point to note is there are different operational and functional models of law 
enforcement throughout the United States.  Fusion centers are no different since they are 
an element of state or local government and have the challenge to meet the unique needs 
of the jurisdiction they serve.  As observed in one study, 
Fusion centers [must identify] their mission and their customers, at 
what level of analytic product they will produce, and to whom.  
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Not all fusion centers will need the same amount of strategic 
analysis or tactical analysis, but, in order to determine what to 
produce, they will have to understand their customers’ needs and 
ensure they are educated so they understand the difference between 
the two products.  Fusion centers will also need to determine how 
they will integrate the emergency responder community 
(Nenneman, 2008:109). 
 It is, perhaps, this last point that will be the most challenging to define since “all 
hazards intelligence” and “meeting the needs of the emergency responder community” 
are not traditional roles for the law enforcement intelligence function.  Some guidance to 
assist fusion centers in this area is being developed through the identification of “baseline 
capabilities”. 
 
Baseline Capabilities for Intelligence Fusion Centers 
 As a result of national plans that seek to increase the efficiency and effectiveness 
of information sharing efforts, fusion centers serve as the interlink between state, local, 
and tribal law enforcement and the federal Information Sharing Environment for the 
exchange of terrorism information.  As such, it was recognized that there was a need to 
define fundamental baseline operational capabilities that should be used by fusion 
centers, as well as major urban area intelligence units, in order to meet the information 
needs of all consumers of the various intelligence centers.  In practice, the “baseline 
capabilities” serve as performance standards that can be used to measure effectiveness of 
the fusion center, of the fusion process and of personnel.   
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A joint project of the Global Intelligence Working Group, U.S. Department of 
Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Program Manager-Information 
Sharing Environment, resulted in a companion document to the Fusion Center Guidelines 
that identifies elements that serve as the foundation for integrating state and major urban 
area fusion centers into the federal Information Sharing Environment.  The project is 
based on the fusion process capabilities outlined in the 2007 Fusion Center Assessment 
and the 2007 and 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program, Fusion Capability Planning 
Tool Supplemental Resource (DHS, 2007).  In addition to the 2007 Assessment, the 
baseline operational standards outlined in the project were developed using guidance 
provided in the Fusion Center Guidelines, the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 
Plan (NCISP), the Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan, and the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security’s National Preparedness Guidelines and Target 
Capabilities List (TCL).  Relying on the guidance of these national standards, the 
baseline capabilities for fusion centers is guided by the requirements of the Presidential 
National Strategy for Information Sharing. 
 The limitation, however, is that the capabilities are only directed toward 
“terrorism information” – which includes both terrorism and crimes that have a terrorism 
nexus – as a result of the ISE’s legislative mandate from the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.  The DHS Intelligence and Analysis Directorate, has 
completed an appendix to the Baseline Capabilities document which deals with baseline 
capabilities for Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (DHS-IAD, 2008).  Additional 
baseline capabilities are being prepared for the fire service and public health as 
appendices to the baseline capabilities document. 
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 While the structure and processes of baseline capabilities for fusion centers is an 
important step for increasing efficiency and effectiveness, a significant gap remains.  
Specifically, most fusion centers will be dealing with “all crimes” – particularly those 
fusion centers expressly supporting law enforcement agencies that have implemented an 
intelligence-led policing philosophy – using intelligence analysis to guide day-to-day law 
enforcement activities (Ratcliffe, 2008).  However, there is currently no initiative going 
forward that will define baseline capabilities for the type of information and analysis that 
many fusion centers will devote the preponderance of their time to:  crimes of violence, 
drug trafficking, organized crime and other trans-jurisdictional complex criminality. 
 
THE INTELLIGENCE FUSION PROCESS 
 The fusion process is an overarching methodology of managing the flow of 
information and intelligence across levels and sectors of government in order to integrate 
information for analysis (Local Anti-Terrorism Information, 2005).  That is, the process 
relies on active involvement of state, local, tribal and federal law enforcement agencies – 
and sometimes non-law enforcement agencies (e.g. private sector) – to provide the input 
of raw information for intelligence analysis.  As the array of diverse information sources 
increases, there will be more accurate and robust analysis that can be disseminated as 
intelligence.   
 While the phrase “fusion center” has been used widely, often there are 
misconceptions about the function of the center.  Perhaps the most common 
misconception is that the center is a large room full of work stations where the staff is 
constantly responding to inquiries from officers, investigators and agents.  This vision is 
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more accurately a “watch center” or “investigative support center” – not an intelligence 
fusion center.  Another common misconception is that the fusion center is minimally 
staffed until there is some type of crisis wherein representatives from different public 
safety agencies converge to staff work stations to manage the crisis.  This is an 
“emergency operations center”, not an intelligence fusion center.   
The fusion center is not an operational center, but a support center.  It is analysis 
driven.  The fusion process proactively seeks to identify threats posed by terrorists or 
criminal enterprises and stop them before they occur – prevention is the essence of the 
intelligence process.  The distinction, however, is that the fusion center is typically 
organized by amalgamating representatives – ideally, mostly intelligence analysts – from 
different federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies into one physical 
location.  Each representative is intended to be a conduit of raw information from his/her 
agency who can infuse that agency-specific information into the collective body of 
information for analysis.  Conversely, when there are intelligence requirementsvii needed 
by the fusion center, the representative is the conduit back to the agency to communicate, 
monitor and process the new information needs.  Similarly, the agency representative 
ensures that analytic products and threat information are directed back to one’s home 
agency for proper dissemination. 
According to the Fusion Center Guidelines, a fusion center is: 
… defined as a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that 
provide resources, expertise, and/or information to the center with 
the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, apprehend, 
and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.  The intelligence 
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component of a fusion center focuses on the intelligence process, 
where information is collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed, 
and disseminated.  Nontraditional collectors of intelligence, such 
as public safety entities and private sector organizations, possess 
important information that can be “fused” with law enforcement 
data to provide meaningful information and intelligence about 
threats and criminal activity (Global Intelligence Working Group, 
2005:8). 
 Obviously, not every law enforcement agency can contribute a person to work in 
the fusion center.  Hence the fusion center must develop mechanisms for two-way 
information sharing that captures information from the “nontraditional collectors” and 
provides threat-based information back to those who have the “need to know”.  As a 
result, multiple strategies and technologies need to be developed for diverse two-way 
information sharing. 
 For example, electronic two-way information sharing via the various secure 
electronic information systems – Regional Information Sharing System (RISS.net), Law 
Enforcement Online (LEO), Homeland Security Information Exchange (HSIN), Anti-
Terrorism Information Exchange (ATIX) – can be very effective.  In the case of ATIX, 
individuals beyond the law enforcement community who have a demonstrated need – 
including private sector persons – may also have access to the system and use it for 
secure two-way information sharing.  Another example is the New York Police 
Department’s “Operation Nexus”: 
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The New York City Police Department’s Operation Nexus is a 
nationwide network of businesses and enterprises joined in an 
effort to prevent another terrorist attack against our citizens. Our 
detectives [visit] firms that have joined us in this mutual effort. 
Members of Operation Nexus are committed to reporting 
suspicious business encounters that they believe may have possible 
links to terrorism.  The NYPD believes terrorists may portray 
themselves as legitimate customers in order to purchase or lease 
certain materials or equipment, or to undergo certain formalized 
training to acquire important skills or licenses. … Through 
Operation Nexus, the NYPD actively encourages business owners, 
operators and their employees to apply their particular business 
and industry knowledge and experience against each customer 
transaction or encounter to discern anything unusual or suspicious 
and to report such instances to authorities (NYC, 2008). 
 Another model has emerged and is being increasingly adopted throughout the 
U.S.  Developed in Los Angeles, the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) group has multiple 
functions, including supporting the intelligence fusion center. 
The Los Angeles TEW includes analysts from local, state and 
federal agencies to produce a range of intelligence products at all 
phases of response (pre-, trans-, and post attack) specifically 
tailored to the user’s operational role and requirements. The TEW 
bridges criminal and operational intelligence to support strategic 
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and tactical users. As part of this process, the TEW seeks to 
identify emerging threats and provide early warning by integrating 
inputs and analysis from a multidisciplinary, interagency team. 
Toward this end, the TEW has developed a local network of 
Terrorism Liaison Officers at law enforcement, fire, and health 
agencies, formed partnerships with the private sector to understand 
threats to critical infrastructure, and has developed and refined 
processes to analyze and synthesize threat data to support its client 
agencies (Sullivan, 2005:1). 
 Regardless of the method of information sharing, the key factors are:  there must 
be diverse raw input, it must be analyzed; and intelligence output must be shared with 
appropriate consumers. 
 
Why Fusion Centers? 
 The heart of good intelligence analysis is to have a diverse array of valid and 
reliable raw information for analysis (Clark, 2007).  The more robust the raw 
information, the more accurate the analytic output (i.e., intelligence) will be.  If one 
thinks of information input in terms of bandwidth, the typical law enforcement 
intelligence unit has a narrow bandwidth.  That is, information is gathered from a fairly 
narrow array of sources, thereby limiting both the quality of the analysis and the ability to 
see the “big picture” of a criminal enterprise.  Quite simply, the more limited the input of 
raw information, the more limited the quality of intelligence.  However, if the number of 
sources is broadened to include a wide range of agencies representing much broader 
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geographic and jurisdictional parameters, then the bandwidth is much wider.  With wider 
bandwidth, there is a greater (and more diverse) information flow.  Therefore, with 
greater information flow, the analysis becomes more accurate and utilitarian.  As the 
quality of analysis increases, the ability to prevent or mitigate the operations of a terrorist 
or criminal organization increases exponentially.  
 These observations are reinforced by recent analyses of both law enforcement and 
national security intelligence operations found a problem that has been referred to as the 
“stovepipe” of information in agencies (Kindsvater, 2003).  That is, each agency would 
develop a large body of information and analytic products that would be retained within 
the agency and rarely shared with other agencies.  Analysis was generally limited to the 
information that came from internal sources and dissemination of information was also 
largely internal.  As a result, while agencies were developing information it was simply 
being stacked, metaphorically like a stovepipe.  Current thought recognizes that far more 
value can be derived from information that is widely shared for analysis – information 
from one agency may be a key in learning about a threat when integrated with 
information another agency.  Hence, there was a need to “fuse” as much information as 
possible. As noted in a report from the Heritage Foundation, the fusion center would not 
simply duplicate the activities of existing agencies, but would enhance and improve their 
efforts by providing a service that does not yet exist (Dillon, 2002). 
 
A Reorientation from the Current Intelligence Model 
 Law enforcement intelligence at the state, local and tribal levels has been 
organizationally and operationally haphazard at best.  Most of America’s law 
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enforcement agencies had no intelligence capacity at all.  Many that did have an 
“intelligence unit” of some form were doing little, if any, analysis.  In reality, most were 
investigative support centers where officers could call and get various types of 
information about investigations and cases.  Often the personnel staffing the units, while 
perhaps having the title of “analyst” were typically clerical people who had been 
promoted, often with little if any training in formal intelligence analysis techniques. 
 Some agencies had formally trained analysts; however their analytic products 
were frequently inconsistent and were often “stove piped”.  One reason for the lack of 
information sharing was that the predominant philosophy was that of “operations 
security” for intelligence reports.  This fundamentally meant that because of concern that 
information from intelligence reports may be “leaked”, very rigid “right to know” and 
“need to know” dissemination standards were used.  Essentially, this meant that an 
officer typically would not see an intelligence report unless he or she was working on the 
inquiry. 
 Fusion centers, and the NCISP, have changed many of these traditional 
characteristics.  Having multiple agencies participate in a center means that there is less 
likelihood the intelligence will be “stove piped” and will, conversely be more widely 
disseminated.  On this last point, the philosophy of intelligence has also changed.  While 
operations security remains a concern, the predominant approach is to disseminate 
intelligence to as many law enforcement officers as possible. The rationale is that the 
more officers who have information about threats, the more likely that threat will be 
identified and mitigated. 
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Human Resource Issues 
 Staffing the fusion centers is obviously a critical responsibility.  Because they 
take different forms, staffing patterns vary, however there are certain trends that have 
emerged.  The “lead agency”viii for the fusion center will have primary staffing 
responsibility and typically will provide the center’s management personnel, most 
operational staffing and employ new staff, such as intelligence analysts.  Larger agencies 
within the fusion center’s service area will be asked to contribute staff, typically on a 
“temporary duty” status with assignment and duty responsibilities articulated in a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the fusion center and the contributing 
agencies.   
 Beyond these staff members, the FBI is assigning at least one agent, and 
sometimes analysts, to each fusion center.  In addition, the Department of Homeland 
Security Intelligence and Analysis Directorate (I&A) is assigning at least one person to 
most of the primary state fusion centers.  In many cases, the National Guard assigns 
analysts and different federal agencies – such as the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) – will 
assign personnel.  Once again, there is no explicit model for assignment – it is usually 
based on local needs and often personal relationships. 
 In reality, there is a limited supply of professional law enforcement intelligence 
analysts in the U.S. largely because most law enforcement agencies did not want to 
budget for professional positions.  Many analysts were clerical personnel with limited 
knowledge, skills, abilities and training in intelligence – an issue compounded by a lack 
of recognized professional standards for intelligence analysts (Marin, 2008).  Rather they 
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were reliable employees who were given expended duties.  One major reason this 
occurred was that many law enforcement executives felt they could not justify paying 
high salaries to non-sworn analysts – they would opt to hire sworn officers instead.  Some 
executives, however, saw the value of intelligence analysts and ensured they had the 
“best and brightest” people whom they could pay competitively. 
One example of this is former Spokane, Washington Police Chief Roger Bragdon.  
When faced with a multimillion dollar budget reduction, Chief Bragdon faced the 
realization that it was inevitable that some Spokane police employees would lose their 
jobs.  When faced with this difficult decision Chief Bragdon elected to furlough a number 
of sworn officers, however, none of his department’s crime analysts or intelligence 
analysts lost their jobs.  His reasoning, based on his experience, was simple:  Using the 
analysts’ reports, Spokane officers “worked smarter” (Bragdon, 2008).  It was, in Chief 
Bragdon’s view, the most reasonable alternative.  The investment in analysts permitted 
the department to continue maintaining a safe community by focusing operational 
activities to crime and threat priorities.   
 
COLLATERAL ISSUES 
Beyond questions related to the efficacy of the intelligence fusion process, a 
number of issues have emerged about the operations of fusion centers.  There are sharply 
diverse perspectives of these issues between advocates and critics. 
 
Is There a Role for the Private Sector? 
24 
 
 The Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment observed that the 
private sector can be a rich resource of information that adds a broadened dimension to 
information collection.  Many large corporations have sophisticated security operations 
that monitor global threats to their facilities, products and personnel posed by organized 
crime and criminal extremists as well as predatory criminals (NIAC, 2006).  This type of 
information is often different than that collected by law enforcement organizations and 
can add a unique, and more insightful, component to the body of information being 
analyzed by the fusion center. 
 Similarly, the private sector is often a legitimate consumer of law enforcement 
intelligence meeting the “right to know” and “need to know” information sharing 
standards.  For example, 85% of the U.S. critical infrastructure is owned by the private 
sector (National Preparedness Directorate, 2006).  Moreover, the private sector has a 
large personnel force who, if given the proper information, can significantly increase the 
“eyes and ears on the street” to observe individuals and behaviors that pose threats.  As 
noted in one the “Best Practices” papers produced by the Department of Homeland 
Security, “a jurisdiction’s analysis and synthesis entity, [such as a fusion center], should 
also establish processes for sharing information with the local private sector” (Local Anti-
Terrorism Information, 2005).  However, critics have expressed the concern that there is 
information in fusion centers that private sector personnel should not have access to 
(German & Stanley, 2007).  The caution goes on to note that the inclusion of the private 
sector represents “…the creation of a ‘Surveillance-Industrial Complex’ in which security 
agencies and the corporate sector join together in a frenzy of mass information gathering, 
tracking and routine surveillance” (German & Stanley, 2007:11). 
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 Of course, there are information sharing issues that need to be resolved.  For 
example, certain types of personal information may be inappropriate for law enforcement 
to release to the private sector.  Similarly, many in the private are concerned that 
proprietary information related to corporate products may be inappropriately released.  
Despite these limitations and concerns, there appears to be a legitimate role for the 
private sector in fusion centers.  Just as in the case of law enforcement partners, 
Memoranda of Understanding and Non-Disclosure Agreements need to be in place that 
includes provisions on information sharing processes and restrictions. 
 
Resistance to the Fusion Center Concept 
 Law enforcement agencies have historically been resistant to information sharing 
for several reasons.  One of the concerns has been that when information is shared, the 
original agency loses control of future dissemination.  This is a legitimate concern 
because of privacy and liability issues, notably if there is no guarantee that the 
information would be controlled (FCW, 2008).  Another reason for poor information 
sharing was agency ego – information is power and those who have more information can 
have more influence (Beare & Murray, 2007).  While this appears to represent a minority 
of cases, it nonetheless exists.  A final, somewhat mundane, reason for poor information 
sharing is that it was not convenient because of technological or logistical reasons 
(Slayton, 2000).   
 It was recognized post-9/11 that not only did the intelligence community need to 
become more adept at information sharing, so did the law enforcement community.  With 
policy recommendations established in both the NCISP and the Fusion Center 
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Guidelines, many of the logistical issues were resolved.  Similarly with growing access to 
secure information systems that were based on Internet protocols – RISS.net, LEO, and 
HSIN – the technology was enhancing more widespread information sharing to agencies 
of all sizes. 
 This enhanced information sharing was not welcomed by all.  In a statement 
released by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), concern was expressed by civil 
libertarians that intelligence fusion centers may jeopardize civil rights.  The ACLU 
stated, 
The establishment of a single source intelligence center 
raises important issues concerning the scope of its 
operations and need for safeguards to ensure that its 
operation do not violate civil liberties or intrude on 
personal privacy (ACLU, 2005). 
 Continuing on this theme, the ACLU explicitly stated questions it wanted 
answered about fusion center operations. 
We need a lot more information about what precisely the 
fusion center will do, what information it will be collecting, 
who will have access to the information, and what 
safeguards will be in place to prevent abuse (ACLU, 2005). 
 Every fusion center commander should be able to answer those questions – if not; 
the policy and process infrastructure of the center needs to be re-examined. 
 
Fusion Centers and Civil Rights Issues 
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 There is a concern among many privacy advocates that the growth of fusion 
centers will increase the jeopardy to citizens’ civil rights and privacy (Rossler, 2003; 
Sullivan, 2003; Dinh, 2004, House of Representatives, 2008).  As noted in a National 
Governor’s Association “Best Practices” paper, “The risks to individuals’ privacy begin 
when personal information of any kind is entered into criminal justice information 
systems” (MacLellan, 2006:4).  Complicating this issue is the fact that not understanding 
the concept of the fusion process, many privacy advocates fear that the centers are the 
next iteration of centralized surveillance of citizens. 
 One of the greatest concerns about fusion centers in this regard is participation of 
federal law enforcement agencies and National Guard personnel whose jurisdictions for 
information collection and retention are different than state, local and tribal law 
enforcement agencies.  Certainly, when a state, local or tribal law enforcement agency is 
the custodian of an intelligence records’ system, care must be taken to exclude 
information from the fusion center that does not meet the standards of information 
collection, retention, dissemination, and purging as articulated in the federal regulation 28 
CFR Part 23ix, as per the recommendations in the Fusion Center Guidelines and the 
NCISP. 
Fundamentally, the privacy and civil rights issues of citizens related to fusion 
centers are the same as any other aspect of the intelligence process.  Those relevant 
standards of the NCISP apply in the same manner and should be fully adhered to.  
Further, Guideline 8 of the Fusion Center Guidelines states that the management of the 
fusion center should, “Develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil rights policy” 
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(Global Intelligence Working Group, 2005:49). Commentary on this guideline goes on to 
note that… 
…one of the critical issues that could quickly stop intelligence 
sharing is the real or perceived violation of individuals’ privacy 
and constitutional rights through the use of intelligence sharing 
systems. In order to balance law enforcement’s ability to share 
information while ensuring that the rights of citizens are upheld, 
appropriate privacy policies must be in place (Global Intelligence 
Working Group, 2005:49). 
 As a consequence, civil rights issues for fusion centers have components related 
to policy, training, supervision and public information that must be addressed in the 
development and implementation stages. 
 
Fusion Centers and the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) 
 The ISE Implementation Plan embraced the growth of fusion centers as a critical 
linchpin to serve as information clearinghouses between federal entities (both federal law 
enforcement and the Intelligence Community), non-federal law enforcement and the 
private sector. 
 [M]any States and localities emphatically moved to create and 
invest in fusion centers in the post-9/11 environment. These fusion 
centers now play a prominent role in collecting, analyzing, and 
sharing terrorism information. Individually, these centers represent 
vital assets for collecting terrorism-related information. 
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Collectively, their collaboration with the Federal government, with 
one another (state-to-state, state-to-locality), and with the private 
sector represents a tremendous increase in both the nation’s overall 
analytic capacity and the multi-directional flow of information. It 
is important to note that these centers are not homogenous—
considerable variations exist in terms of operations and mission 
focus (e.g., homeland security, law enforcement, emergency 
response). To date, more than 40 such centers have been 
established across the United States, and significant effort has gone 
into developing and adopting standards to facilitate easier 
information access, sharing, and use (PM-ISE, 2006: 7-8). 
 To further this plan, the PM-ISE has established a National Fusion Center 
Coordination Group (NFCCG), led by DHS and DOJ, to identify federal resources to 
support the development of a national, integrated network of fusion centers (General 
Accountability Office, 2007:12).  Moreover, the ISE… 
…recognizes the “all-crimes and all-hazards” nature of state and 
local sharing, where state, local and tribal organizations may share 
and fuse together multiple types of information to address a variety 
of needs including law enforcement, preparedness, and response 
and recovery. In many instances, this information may not initially 
be recognized as terrorism information, but may be information 
that could ultimately prove crucial in preventing, preparing for, or 
responding to terrorism. The ISE focus on terrorism information 
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will not impede or interrupt these additional fusion center 
functions (PM-ISE, 2006:11). 
 
EFFECTIVENESS OF FUSION CENTERS 
 For the most part, fusion centers are so new that there has been no empirical 
assessment of their effectiveness.  There is some anecdotal evidence that suggests 
“success” in four ways (Carter, Forthcoming).  In the experience of the authors who have 
worked with agencies in all regions of the U.S., the fusion centers that are currently 
operating have dramatically increased the amount of information shared among law 
enforcement agencies.  Most have developed explicit “intelligence products” and have 
proactively engaged agencies in their service area to join their networks. 
The first measure of success is whether more information is being shared between 
law enforcement agencies at all levels of government.  There is significant evidence to 
suggest that information sharing has increased (McNamara, 2008), however there are 
factors beyond the creation of fusion centers that have contributed to broader information 
sharing.  These include the creation of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council 
(CICC), overt initiatives by the FBI Directorate of Intelligence to create discernable 
intelligence products that are “written for release”x to state, local and tribal law 
enforcement agencies, and widespread adoption of the NCISP that inherently enhances 
information sharing.   
 The second measure of success deals with the ability to collect, retain and 
disseminate information while protecting the civil rights and privacy of citizens.  Once 
again, anecdotal experiences of the authors indicate that the fusion centers carefully 
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adhere to policy and legal standards for maintaining their intelligence records systems.  
None of the centers have been sued for civil rights violations, although several have been 
the subject of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to determine the types of 
information they are collecting and retaining (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
2008).  Moreover, training programs for fusion center commanders and personnel all 
contain components of civil rights issues. 
 The third measure of effectiveness is more elusive – whether the information and 
intelligence disseminated by the fusion centers have resulted in the prevention, mitigation 
and control of crime and terrorism.  Once again, some anecdotal evidence from different 
fusion centers suggests some successes (Carter, Forthcoming) – largely due to better 
communications between agencies – but it is far too early for a definitive conclusion or 
any type of empirical assessment of success. 
 The fourth measure is whether a fusion center is cost-effective.  This will be 
extremely difficult to measure and will involve some value judgments.  Inherently, the 
intelligence process is inefficient; however, it currently appears to be the best 
methodology to employ for preventing complex, multi-jurisdictional criminality and 
terrorism.  It would seem logical that the amalgamation of intelligence resources in a 
single fusion center would help increase the cost-effectiveness of the process; however, 
empirical assessment of these factors after a “track record” has been established will 
provide better insight.  A final difficult factor to determine in cost-effectiveness is how to 
balance the monetary investment in a fusion center against the fiscal and emotional costs 
that are spared from a terrorist attack.  The answers will not be easy. 
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 A joint report prepared by the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 
Homeland Security and Committee on Foreign Affairs (2008), view the status of 
determining fusion center effectiveness rather critically, mentioning the lack of 
identification of stakeholders and quantitative instruments to determine the extent to 
which their needs are being met has yet to occur (House of Representatives, 2008).  
Moreover, this report questions the quality and value of the intelligence produced by 
fusion centers to provide actionable intelligence to those who need it most.  In reality it is 
far too early to evaluate the effectiveness of fusion centers; however, these variables 
provide guidance for important factors to measure in the near future. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The intelligence fusion process holds a great deal of promise for effective 
intelligence operations.  This is particularly true given the multi-jurisdictional character 
of terrorists’ operations and criminal enterprises.  The three greatest challenges are (1) to 
develop a cooperative and committed relationship between all stakeholders; (2) to 
establish policies and processes that support efficient, effective and lawful intelligence 
operations; and (3) for fusion centers to “stay on message” as an analytic center. 
As with any organization or aspect within society, transformation and reform will not 
occur overnight.  Law enforcement intelligence personnel are continually learning and 
developing best practices to both protect the American people from foreign and domestic 
threats while simultaneously observing the rights afforded to those who are being 
protected.  Fusion centers are diverse and still evolving and present a new type of 
institution into American life (German & Stanley, 2007:22).  The individuals involved 
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and the organization as a whole are responding to meet the current needs of law 
enforcement and as a result, are learning to perform in a manner consistent with the post-
9/11 environment.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                            
iSee http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/Publications/intelsharingreport.pdf and 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1395  
iihttp://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/hidta/ny-nj-content.html  
iiiThe Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (1331 F Street, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 
20530; Telephone: (202) 353-1875/Fax (202) 353-1901) has an insightful unpublished report on 
Metropolitan Area Consolidation/Collocation of Drug Intelligence Elements that describes success and 
challenges for Regional Intelligence Centers. 
ivhttps://www.llis.dhs.gov/channel/channelContentListing.do?channelId=90287&categoryId=5546  
v“Complex criminality” refers to criminal enterprises that are involved in a wide range of criminal activities 
in support of their core enterprise.  For example, a drug trafficking organization may be involved in drug 
production, drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, corruption of public officials, fraud and other 
offenses. 
viThe fusion center Guidelines are often referred to as “federal guidelines” because they are a product of the 
Global Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) of the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) 
which is funded by and advisory to the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Department of Justice.  However, it should be noted that the vast majority of GIWG members are from 
state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies.  Similarly, the group of Subject Matter Experts assembled 
to develop the fusion center Guidelines was also predominantly state, local and tribal representatives. 
vii“Intelligence requirements” are information that is needed to help make a comprehensive and accurate 
analysis of a threat.  See:  (GIWG, October, 2005).  
viiiThe “lead agency” is that organization which has primary responsibility for creating and operating the 
fusion center.  On a state level it is typically either the state police (such as in Michigan) or the state Office 
of Homeland Security (such as in Kentucky).  In other cases a city police department may be designated the 
lead agency (such as in Indiana).  There is no definitive model beyond the fact that one agency must have 
primary responsibility. 
ix 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 is a guideline for law enforcement agencies. It contains 
implementing standards for operating federally grant-funded multijurisdictional criminal intelligence 
systems. It specifically provides guidance in five primary areas: submission and entry of criminal 
intelligence information, security, inquiry, dissemination, and the review-and-purge process. As taken from 
http://www.iir.com/28cfr/Overview.htm 
x“Writing for release” means that the intelligence products are prepared in a “Sensitive But Unclassified” 
form permitting more widespread distribution among law enforcement. 
